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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAHf

;

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

RICHARD C. BAIRD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case N9. 870259-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of Utah (fode Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1986) after a trial in the Fourtn District Court.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether reasonable suspicion existed, based upon

the Trooper's articulated observations, justifying a brief
investigative stop of defendant's vphielp tlo more closely inspect
the displayed registration decal.
2.

Whether defendant was detained beyond the scope of

the investigative detention.
3.

Whether defendant failed to preserve the inventory

search issue for appeal.

CQUJSIIIIITIQNAL PROVISIONSr STATUSES, ANP RULES

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
(1896):
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Richard C. Baird, appeals from a judgment
and conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1986).

Defendant was convicted on May 20, 1987, after a bench

trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 9, 1987 at approximately 3:45 p.m., Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was on regular patrol on
-2-

Interstate 15 about seven miles north of N^phi in Juab County,
Utah (R. 49, 61, 98). Trooper Mangelson's vehicle was parked
parallel to the Interstate facing south as he was clocking
vehicles by radar and checking inspection ^nd registration
stickers as vehicles passed (R. 49f 99). tfhe Trooper observed a
late model Cadillac with Arizona plates travelling northbound at
the speed of 56 M.P.H. (R. 99). As the vehicle passed, the
Trooper observed that the registration decal on the license
plates did not appear to be valid (R. 50, 99). The Trooper
pulled out and proceeded north on Interstate 15 to more closely
observe the decal (R. 50, 99).
After following the vehicle for approximately one mile,
the Trooper observed that the decal clearly displayed the month
of December, but he could not discern whether the registration
year was 1986 or 1987 (R. 50, 62-3, 65, 100).

If the year of

registration was 1986, the registration was expired (R. 64). If
it was 1987, it was valid.

I&.

The Trooper determined that it

was necessary to stop the vehicle to more closely inspect the
registration decal (R. 50, 99).
Stopping directly behind the suspect vehicle, Trooper
Mangelson exited his car, approached the rear of the suspect
vehicle, and observed from a distance of 10 to 15 feet that the
registration decal was valid (R. 57, 67). As he approached the
rear of the car, the Trooper also observed new tires and new air
shocks on the suspect vehicle (R. 57, 101). Passing by the rear
window, he noticed a bumper jack, a lug wrench, and a twisted off
locking gas cap on the rear seat (R. 57, 58, 101).

-3-

Suspicious whether the driver was in proper possession
of the vehicle, the Trooper asked the driver for his license and
registration after explaining the initial purpose of the stop (R.
52-3, 102f 104). The driver, later identified as defendant
produced a Utah driver's license and an Arizona registration slip
(R. 52, 102)•
During the brief conversation with defendant, the
Trooper detected a strong odor of fresh marijuana eminating from
defendant's vehicle (R. 53, 104) . He also noticed a key ring in
the ignition without a gas cap key (R. 52, 102). In response to
brief questioning regarding the ownership of the vehicle,
defendant stated that the had borrowed the vehicle from a girl in
Arizona, that he had wrecked his vehicle in Pheonix, that he did
not know the current address of the owner, and that he did not
know the location of his wrecked vehicle (R. 53, 103, 104).
The Trooper asked defendant if he was carrying any
drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the vehicle (R. 53, 104).
Defendant replied, "no". Id.. The Trooper then asked defendant
if he would mind if he looked through the vehicle.

Id.. Defendant

responded, "I told you there is nothing in the car and I don't
want you looking."

I&.

The Trooper returned to his patrol car

to check on the drivers' license and registration information.

Id.
Upon request, Police dispatch responded that the
vehicle had not been reported stolen but that defendant's
driver's license was suspended (R. 53-4, 104-5).

Defendant was

arrested for driving on a suspended license (R. 54, 105).

4-

Because defendant's vehicle could not remain on the freeway for
safety and liability reasons, a wrecker was called to tow the
vehicle to the Public Safety Building in Nephi (R. 55, 106) .
In accordance with the written policy of the Utah
Highway Patrol, an inventory search was conducted on defendant's
vehicle (R. 55, 107f 110). Fourteen bales of crushed marijuana
weighing 165 pounds were discovered in the trunk of defendant's
vehicle (R. 57-9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trooper Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion that
defendant's vehicle was unregistered based upon his clear
observation that defendant's vehicle did not appear to display a
current registration decal.

Thus, the Trooper was justified in

making a brief investigatory stop to more closely inspect the
registration decal.
Once suspicion was alleviated, the Trooper did not
improperly extend the investigative detention by approaching
defendant to explain the purpose of the stop and that defendant
was free to leave. As the Trooper approached and conversed with
defendant, the Trooper again had a reasonable suspicion based
upon his plain view observations that defendant may be in
possession of a stolen vehicle and/or illegal drugs.
Defendant failed to raise the inventory search issue in
the trial court below and cannot now raise the issue for the
first time on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TROOPER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION
JUSTIFYING AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP.
On appeal, defendant asserts that Trooper Mangelson did
not have a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable factsf
justifying an investigative stop of defendant's vehicle to check
the registration decal.

He further asserts that reasonable

suspicion, if any, evaporated when the Trooper exited his vehicle
and observed the valid registration decal.

Thus, he argues that

defendant was unreasonably detained against his State and Federal
constitutional rights and that all evidence subsequently seized
was inadmissible.
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse.
440 U.S. 648 (1979) declared that the stopping of a vehicle by a
police officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Likewise,

the Utah Supreme Court has stated that such a stop is a seizure
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).

State v.

The United States and Utah

Constitutions do not prohibit all seizures, but rather, they
require a police seizure to be reasonable.

Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App.
1987) .
Citing Terry v. Ohio, this Court in State v. Truiillo.
stated that "a police officer, in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner, may approach a person for purposes of
investigating suspected criminal behavior even though there is
-6-

not probable cause to make an arrest."

Such appropriate

circumstances have been codified in Utah Cdde Ann. S 77-7-15
(1982) which states:
(Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds.) A peace officer
may stop any person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions.
See sl££ United States v. Recaldq, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.
1985): United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984);
Statq v, Swanigartr 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

The reasonable

suspicion standard also applies to investigative stops involving
vehicles.

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
In order to justify a seizure based on reasonable

suspicion, an officer must point to specific, articulable facts
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a person had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Florida v., Royer* 460
U.S. 491, 499 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Trujillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).

This Court in Trujillo

acknowledged that "a trained law enforcement officer may be able
to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would
be wholly innocent to the untrained observer•"

T£iljJ.llfl# 739

P.2d at 88.
In the instant case, Trooper Mangelson suspected that
the vehicle which defendant was driving was not legally
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registered.1

The fact articulated in support of reasonable

suspicion was the Trooper's observance of defendant's vehicle for
approximately one mile in which he could not clearly discern a
current registration decal.

The Trooper acted reasonably in

effectuating a brief investigatory stop to more closely observe
the decal.

Clearly, the Trooper's actions were not arbitrary nor

discriminatory and cannot be said to engender the evils
associated with random license and registration checks. See
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 688 (1979).

Public interest

dictates that a police officer must be constitutionally permitted
to briefly stop a vehicle which objectively appears unregistered.
Once stopped, the Trooper exited his police car,
approached the rear of defendant's vehicle, and observed that the
registration was current (R. 57. 67). The purpose of the initial
stop being satisfied, the detention could not continue any longer
than necessary to inform defendant the reason for the stop and
that he was free to leave.
F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973).

See United States v. Luckett* 484

However, before the Trooper could

explain the reason for the stop, reasonable suspicion again arose
as the Trooper approached defendant.
1

The Utah Motor Vehicle Act provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive
or move or for an owner knowingly to permit
to be driven or moved upon any highway any
vehicle of a type required to be registered
hereunder which is not registered. . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-18 (1981). The Act further provides that a
motor vehicle owned and operated by a nonresident of Utah must be
duly registered in another state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-l-19(f)
(Supp. 1987). Such a violation of the Act constitutes a class B
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (Supp. 1987).
-8-

After exiting the police car. Trooper Mangelson noticed
new tires and new air shocks on defendant's vehicle (R. 57, 101).
As he passed the rear window, he noticed a jumper jack, a lug
wrench, and a twisted off locking gas cap oifi the rear seat (57f
58, 101) .

He further observed a key ring iiji the ignition without

a gas cap key (R. 52, 102). Finally, the Trooper detected a
strong odor of fresh marijuana eminating frc^m the vehicle as he
conversed with defendant (R. 53, 104).
Based upon the observations and inferences noted above,
combined with Trooper Mangelsonfs twenty ye^rs of law enforcement
experience, a reasonable person could suspecbt either of the
following:

first, defendant did not have lawful possession of

the vehicle as evidenced by the twisted off locking gas cap and
absence of a gas cap key; second, defendant was transporting a
large quantity of marijuana as evidenced by the strong odor of
marijuana and the new tires and air shocks.

Reasonable suspicion

again being present, the Trooper was justified in further
investigating the ownership of the vehicle, whether defendant had
proper possession of the vehicle, and whether defendant may be
transporting marijuana.
In response to the Trooper's inquiry, defendant stated
that he had borrowed the car from a girl in Arizona, that he had
wrecked his car in Pheonix, that he did not know the present
address of the owner, and that he did not kriow the location of
his wrecked car (R. 53, 103, 104). Defendants response failing
to satisfy the Trooper's suspicions, the Trooper returned to his
vehicle to run a stolen vehicle and driver'^ license check.

-9-

14.

Upon receiving information from police dispatch that defendant's
driver's license was suspended, Trooper Mangelson had probable
cause to arrest defendant (R. 53-4, 104-5).
In summary, applying Fourth Amendment standards to the
case at hand, Trooper Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion based
upon his observations while following defendant's vehicle that
defendant was in violation of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act which
requires a current car registration.

Once the Trooper's

suspicions were satisfied, he acted reasonably in approaching
defendant to explain the purpose of the stop*

Before the Trooper

could explain the stop, reasonable suspicion was again aroused by
further observations and detections while approaching and
conversing with defendant.
Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court
case of Delaware v. Prouse* 440 U.S. 648 (1979) is analagous to
the present case.

In Prouse, a police officer stopped a vehicle

in order to check the driver's license and car registration.

Id.

at 650. Prior to the stop, the officer did not observe any
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity.
The United States Supreme Court held:
that except in those situations in which
there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or an occupant is
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the
driver in order to check his driver's license
and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. . . .
Id. at 663.
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Id.

The present case is distinguishable from prouse in that
Trooper Mangelson was not arbitrarily stopping vehicles for spot
checks of automobile registrations.

Rather, Trooper Mangelson, a

twenty-year veteran of law enforcementf observed that the vehicle
which defendant was driving did not clearly display a current
registration decal (R. 50, 62-3, 65, 100). This observation was
made after following defendant's vehicle fot approximately a
mile.

14.

Under Prouse* no further justification need exist if

the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an automobile
is unregistered.

440 U.S. at 663.

Defendant also cites jSjtate v, Car^ena, 714 P.2d 674
(Utah 1986) as factually similar to the case at hand.

In

Carpena, a police officer observed a slow-moving vehicle with
Arizona plates at 3:00 a.m. in a residential area where there had
been a recent rash of burglaries.

After following the car for

three blocks, the officer initiated a stop.
In contrast, Trooper Mangelson based his stop on the
clear observation that defendant's vehicle did not appear to
display a valid registration decal.

The Trooper's stop was not

based on a mere "hunch" or "feeling" as defendant argues.
Instead, the stop was based upon the objective belief that a
motor vehicle violation existed.

Therefor^, the investigative

stop to more closely observe the registration decal was not an
unconstitutional detention.
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POINl1 II
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DETAINED BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE INVESTIGATION.
Defendant argues that even if the initial stop was
justified, an illegal detention occurred after the Trooper
observed the valid decal and continued to walk toward defendant's
vehicle.

Defendant's argument lacks reason.
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.

1979), the Ninth Circuit ruled that absent further justification,
a detention must not continue longer than necessary to satisfy
the initial purpose of the stop.

In Luckett* a police officer

detained a pedestrian to run a warrant check after the police
officer had completed a jaywalking citation.

Id. at 90.

In the present casef Trooper Mangelson continued to
walk toward defendant's vehicle after he observed the valid
registration decal.

If nothing else, common courtesy justified

Trooper Mangelson's approaching defendant to explain the reason
for the stop and that defendant was free to leave.

It would be

unreasonable to have required the Trooper to freeze in his tracks
as he noticed the valid decal and waive defendant on without the
courtesy of an explanation for the stop.

The fact that the

Trooper chose to verbalize rather than signal to defendant that
he was free to leave should not be considered an improper
extension of an otherwise valid stop.
As discussed in Point I, reasonable suspicion was again
raised as the Trooper observed the twisted off locking gas cap
and other items in plain view as he approached defendant.
a further investigative detention was justified to inquire
-12-

Thus,

whether defendant was in proper possession of the vehicle.

The

evidence seized pursuant to the investigation and subsequent
arrest was therefore not the fruit of an illegal detention.

POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT IN THfe TRIAL COURT
AND THUS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE INVENTORY
SEARCH ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
Defendant argues that even assuming the stop and
subsequent arrest were valid, the search of his car was not an
inventory search, or at least, was improperly conducted.
However# defendant failed to object to the search at both the
suppression hearing and trial.

In fact, tpe entire emphasis of

defendant's suppression motion was based 0^1 his claim of an
improper stop, not an improper search (R. [L3, 14, 17-23) •
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that a defendant
waives his right to challenge a ground for suppressing the
evidence when he fails to object at trial.
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).

State v. Carter, 707

In Carter, the Court stated as

follows:
where a defendant fails to assert a
particular ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court still not consider that ground
on appeal.
i£.

(Emphasis added) .

The Court further hoted that:

n

[T]he failure to assert a particular ground
in a pre-trial suppression motion operates as
a waiver of the right to challenge the
subsequent admission on that ground."
!&•

(Citations omitted.)
The facts in the present case ar^ identical to those in
:e v. Constantinp, 7 32 P.2d 125 (Utah 1^87) where the Supreme
-13-

Court refused to reach the defendant's inventory search issue
because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
Exceptions to the waiver doctrine have been limited to
special circumstances.

The Supreme Court in Carter explained

that:
"Generally, there is no justification for not
presenting all available grounds in support
of a motion to suppress, and in the absence
of special circumstances an appellate court
will not rule on grounds not addressed in the
trial court." . . .
Carter at 660-61. Defendant fails to allege any special
circumstances or explanations justifying an exception to the
waiver doctrine.

Accordingly, this Court should find that the

inventory search issue was not raised in the trial court below
and cannot therefore be considered for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
DATED this / £ ^

cTay of April, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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